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Abstract
Using the concept of principal stratification from the causal inference literature, we introduce a
new notion of fairness, called principal fairness, for human and algorithmic decision-making. The
key idea is that one should not discriminate among individuals who would be similarly affected
by the decision. Unlike the existing statistical definitions of fairness, principal fairness explicitly
accounts for the fact that individuals can be influenced by the decision. We motivate principal
fairness by the belief that all people are created equal, implying that the potential outcomes
should not depend on protected attributes such as race and gender once we adjust for relevant
covariates. Under this assumption, we show that principal fairness implies all three existing
statistical fairness criteria, thereby resolving the previously recognized tradeoffs between them.
Finally, we discuss how to empirically evaluate the principal fairness of a particular decision.
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Although the notion of fairness has long been studied, the increasing reliance on algorithmic
decision-making in today’s society has led to the fast growing literature on algorithmic fairness (see
e.g., Corbett-Davies and Goel, 2018; Chouldechova and Roth, 2020, and references therein). In this
paper, we introduce a new definition of fairness, called principal fairness, for human and algorith-
mic decision-making. Unlike the existing statistical fairness criteria, principal fairness incorporates
causality into fairness based on the idea that one should not discriminate among individuals who
would be similarly affected by the decision.1
Consider a judge who decides, at a first appearance hearing, whether to detain or release an
arrestee pending disposition of any criminal charges. Suppose that the outcome of interest is whether
the arrestee commits a new crime before the case is resolved. According to principal fairness, the
judge should not discriminate between arrestees if they would behave in the same way under each
of two potential scenarios — detained or released. For example, if both of them would not commit
a new crime regardless of the decision, then the judge should not treat them differently. Therefore,
principal fairness is related to individual fairness (Dwork et al., 2012), which demands that similar
individuals should be treated similarly. The critical feature of principal fairness is that the similarity
is measured based on the potential, i.e., both factual and counterfactual, outcomes.
1 Principal fairness
We begin by formally defining principal fairness. Let Di ∈ {0, 1} be the binary decision variable
and Yi ∈ {0, 1} be the binary outcome variable of interest. Following the standard causal inference
literature (e.g., Neyman, 1923; Fisher, 1935; Rubin, 1974; Holland, 1986), we use Yi(d) to denote the
potential value of the outcome that would be realized if the decision is Di = d. Then, the observed
outcome can be written as Yi = Yi(Di).
Principal strata are defined as the joint potential outcome values, i.e., Ri = (Yi(1), Yi(0)), (Fran-
gakis and Rubin, 2002). Since any causal effect can be written as a function of potential outcomes,
e.g., Yi(1) − Yi(0), each principal stratum represents how an individual would be affected by the
decision with respect to the outcome of interest. When both the decision and outcome variables are
binary, we have a total of four principal strata. It is important to note that unlike the observed
outcome, the potential outcomes, and hence principal strata, represent the pre-determined charac-
teristics of individuals and are not affected by the decision. Moreover, since we do not observe Yi(1)
and Yi(0) simultaneously for any individual, principal strata are not directly observable.
1Principal fairness differs from counterfactual fairness, which considers the potential outcomes with respect to a
protected attribute rather than a decision itself (Kusner et al., 2017).
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Group A Group B
Yi(0) = 1 Yi(0) = 0 Yi(0) = 1 Yi(0) = 0
Dangerous Preventable Dangerous Preventable
Yi(1) = 1
Detained (Di = 1) 120 70 80 100
Released (Di = 0) 30 70 20 100
Backlash Safe Backlash Safe
Yi(1) = 0
Detained (Di = 1) 30 30 20 40
Released (Di = 0) 30 120 20 160
Table 1: Numerical illustration of principal fairness. Each cell represents a principal stratum defined
by the values of two potential outcomes (Yi(1), Yi(0)), while two numbers within the cell represent
the number of individuals detained (Di = 1) and that of those released (Di = 0), respectively. This
example illustrates principal fairness because Groups A and B have the same detention rate within
each principal stratum.
In the criminal justice example, the principal strata are defined by whether or not each arrestee
commits a new crime under each of the two scenarios — released or detained — determined by the
judge’s decision. Let Di = 1 (Di = 0) represent the judge’s decision to detain (release) an arrestee,
and Yi = 1 (Yi = 0) denote that the arrestee commits (does not commit) a new crime. Then,
the stratum Ri = (0, 1) represents the “preventable” group of arrestees who would commit a new
crime only when released, whereas the stratum Ri = (1, 1) is the “dangerous” group of individuals
who would commit a new crime regardless of the judge’s decision. Similarly, we might refer to the
stratum Ri = (0, 0) as the “safe” group of arrestees who would never commit a new crime, whereas
the stratum Ri = (1, 0) represents the “backlash” group of individuals who would commit a new
crime only when detained.
Principal fairness implies that the decision is independent of protected attribute within each
principal stratum. We now give the formal definition of principal fairness.
Definition 1 (Principal fairness) A decision-making mechanism satisfies principal fairness with
respect to the outcome of interest and the protected attribute Ai if the resulting decision Di is con-
ditionally independent of Ai within each principal stratum Ri, i.e., Pr(Di | Ri, Ai) = Pr(Di | Ri).
Note that principal fairness requires one to specify the outcome of interest as well as the attribute
to be protected. As such, a decision-making mechanism that is fair with respect to one outcome
(attribute) may not be fair with respect to another outcome (attribute).
Table 1 presents a numerical illustration in the context of the criminal justice example, in which
the detention rate is identical between Groups A and B within each principal stratum. For example,
within the “dangerous” stratum, the detention rate is 80% for the two groups, while it is 20% for
both groups within the “safe” stratum. Indeed, the decision is independent of group membership
2
Group A Group B
Detained Released Detained Released
Yi = 1 190 60 180 140
Yi = 0 60 190 60 260
Table 2: Observed data calculated from Table 1. None of the statistical fairness criteria given in
Definition 2 is met.
given principal strata, thereby satisfying principal fairness.
2 Comparison with the statistical fairness criteria
How does principal fairness differ from the existing definitions of statistical fairness? We consider
the following criteria (see e.g., Corbett-Davies and Goel, 2018; Chouldechova and Roth, 2020, for
reviews).
Definition 2 (Statistical Fairness) A decision-making mechanism is fair with respect to the
outcome of interest Yi and the protected attribute Ai if the resulting decision Di satisfies a certain
conditional independence relationship. Such relationships used in the literature are given below.
(a) Overall parity: Pr(Di | Ai) = Pr(Di)
(b) Calibration: Pr(Yi | Di, Ai) = Pr(Yi | Di)
(c) Accuracy: Pr(Di | Yi, Ai) = Pr(Di | Yi)
In our example, suppose that the protected attribute is race. Then, the overall parity implies that a
judge should detain the same proportion of arrestees across racial groups. In contrast, the calibration
criterion requires a judge to make decisions such that the fraction of detained (released) arrestees who
commit a new crime is identical across racial groups. Finally, according to the accuracy criterion, a
judge must make decisions such that among those who committed (did not commit) a new crime,
the same proportion of arrestees had been detained across racial groups.
Principal fairness differs from these statistical fairness criteria in that it accounts for the possi-
bility of the decision affecting the outcome. In particular, although the accuracy criterion resembles
principal fairness, the former conditions upon the observed rather than potential outcomes. Table 2
presents the observed data consistent with the numerical example shown in Table 1. Although this
example satisfies principal fairness, it fails to meet the accuracy criterion as well as the other two
statistical fairness criteria. For example, among those who committed a new crime, the detention
rate is much higher for Group A than Group B. The reason is that among these arrestees, the pro-
portion of “dangerous” individuals is greater for Group A than that for Group B, and the judge is
on average more likely to issue the detention decision for these individuals.
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3 All people are created equal
How should we reconcile this tension between principal fairness and the existing statistical fair-
ness criteria? The tradeoffs between different fairness criteria are not new. Chouldechova (2017)
and Kleinberg et al. (2017) show that it is generally impossible to simultaneously satisfy the three
statistical fairness criteria introduced in Definition 2. Below, we show how the assumption, which
underlies the notion of principal fairness, can be used to resolve these tradeoffs.
Principal fairness is motivated by the belief that all people are created equal with respect to
the potential outcomes of interest. Recall that the principal strata represent the pre-determined
characteristics of individuals, which are not affected by the decision. In our application, for example,
we may justify principal fairness by assuming that no racial group has an innate tendency to be
dangerous. In other words, once we adjust for economic and social factors that are relevant for
committing a new crime, all racial groups should have the same proportion of dangerous arrestees.
Similarly, the remaining three principal strata should be equally distributed across the racial groups
conditional on these covariates. We formalize this assumption as follows.
Assumption 1 (All people are created equal) There exist a set of covariates Wi such that
the principal strata are conditionally independent of the protected attribute given Wi, i.e., Ri ⊥⊥ Ai |
Wi.
The following theorem shows that under Assumption 1, principal fairness implies all three sta-
tistical fairness criteria, conditional on the relevant covariates.
Theorem 1 (Principal fairness implies statistical fairness) Suppose that Assumption 1 holds.
Then, conditional on Wi, principal fairness in Definition 1 implies all three statistical definitions of
fairness given in Definition 2. That is, under Assumption 1, Pr(Di | Ri,Wi, Ai) = Pr(Di | Ri,Wi)
implies Pr(Di | Wi, Ai) = Pr(Di | Wi), Pr(Yi | Di,Wi, Ai) = Pr(Yi | Di,Wi), and Pr(Di |
Yi,Wi, Ai) = Pr(Di | Yi,Wi).
Proof is given in Appendix S1.1. Theorem 1 shows that if all people are assumed to be created equal,
principal fairness can resolve the tradeoffs between the competing definitions of statistical fairness.
4 Equivalence between principal fairness and statistical fairness
Theorem 1 shows that under Assumption 1, principal fairness represents a stronger notion of fairness
than the existing statistical fairness definitions. We next show that principal definition is equivalent
to these statistical fairness criteria under the additional assumption of monotonicity.
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Assumption 2 (Monotonicity)
Yi(1) ≤ Yi(0)
for all i.
Assumption 2 is plausible in many applications. In our criminal justice example, the assumption
implies that being detained does not make it easier to commit a new crime than being released. The
following theorem establishes the equivalence relationship between principal fairness and statistical
fairness under this additional assumption.
Theorem 2 (Equivalence between principal fairness and statistical fairness) Suppose
that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then, conditional on Wi, principal fairness is equivalent to the three
statistical fairness criteria given in Definition 2.
Proof is given in Appendix S1.2.
5 Empirical evaluation of principal fairness
Since principal strata are not directly observable, it is important to discuss an additional assumption
required for empirically evaluating the principal fairness of particular decision. In particular, we must
identify the conditional distribution of the decision given the principal stratum and some observed
covariates Xi, i.e., Pr(Di | Ri,Xi). We introduce the following unconfoundedness assumption that
is widely invoked in the causal inference literature.
Assumption 3 (Unconfoundedness) Yi(d) ⊥⊥ Di | Xi.
Assumption 3 holds if Xi contains all the information used for decision-making which may include
the protected attribute.2 The next theorem shows that under Assumptions 2 and 3, the evaluation
of principal fairness reduces to the estimation of regression function, Pr(Yi = 1 | Di, Xi).
Theorem 3 (Identification) Under Assumptions 2 and 3, we have
Pr(Di = 1 | Ri = (0, 0), Ai) = 1− Pr(Di = 0, Yi = 0 | Ai)E{Pr(Yi = 0 | Di = 0,Xi) | Ai} ,
Pr(Di = 1 | Ri = (0, 1), Ai) = E{Pr(Yi = 1 | Di = 0,Xi) | Ai} − Pr(Yi = 1 | Ai)E{Pr(Yi = 1 | Di = 0,Xi) | Ai} − E{Pr(Yi = 1 | Di = 1,Xi) | Ai} ,
Pr(Di = 1 | Ri = (1, 1), Ai) = Pr(Di = 1, Yi = 1 | Ai)E{Pr(Yi = 1 | Di = 1,Xi) | Ai} .
In Appendix S1.3, we prove this theorem and generalize it to the evaluation of principal fairness
conditional on relevant covariates Wi.
2In practice, if we are unsure about whether the protected attribute is used for decision-making, we may still include
it in Xi to make the unconfoundedness assumption more plausible (VanderWeele and Shpitser, 2011).
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6 Concluding Remarks
To assess the fairness of human and algorithmic decision-making, we must consider how the deci-
sions themselves affect individuals. This requires the notion of fairness to be placed in the causal
inference framework. In ongoing work, we extend principal fairness to the common settings, in which
humans make decisions partly based on the recommendations produced by algorithms. Since human
decision-makers rather than algorithms ultimately impact individuals, the fairness of algorithmic
recommendations critically depends on how they can improve the fairness of human decisions.
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Supplementary Appendix
S1 Proofs
S1.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Because the observed stratum (Di = 1, Yi = 1) is a mixture of principal strata Ri = (1, 0), (1, 1), we
have
Pr(Di = 1, Yi = 1 |Wi, Ai)
= Pr(Di = 1, Ri = (1, 0) |Wi, Ai) + Pr(Di = 1, Ri = (1, 1) |Wi, Ai)
= Pr(Di = 1 | Ri = (1, 0),Wi, Ai) Pr(Ri = (1, 0) |Wi, Ai)
+ Pr(Di = 1 | Ri = (1, 1),Wi, Ai) Pr(Ri = (1, 1) |Wi, Ai)
= Pr(Di = 1 | Ri = (1, 0),Wi) Pr(Ri = (1, 0) |Wi)
+ Pr(Di = 1 | Ri = (1, 1),Wi) Pr(Ri = (1, 1) |Wi)
= Pr(Di = 1, Ri = (1, 0) |Wi) + Pr(Di = 1, Ri = (1, 1) |Wi)
= Pr(Di = 1, Yi = 1 |Wi),
where the third equality follows from principal fairness and Assumption 1. Similarly, we can show
Pr(Di = d, Yi = y |Wi, Ai) = Pr(Di = d, Yi = y |Wi) (S1)
for d, y = 0, 1. Therefore, we have
Pr(Di |Wi, Ai) = Pr(Di, Yi = 1 |Wi, Ai) + Pr(Di, Yi = 0 |Wi, Ai)
= Pr(Di, Yi = 1 |Wi) + Pr(Di, Yi = 0 |Wi)
= Pr(Di |Wi), (S2)
and
Pr(Yi |Wi, Ai) = Pr(Di = 1, Yi |Wi, Ai) + Pr(Di = 0, Yi |Wi, Ai)
= Pr(Di = 1, Yi |Wi) + Pr(Di = 0, Yi |Wi)
= Pr(Yi |Wi). (S3)
Then, from (S1) and (S2), we have Pr(Yi | Di,Wi, Ai) = Pr(Yi | Di,Wi), and from (S1) and (S3),
we have Pr(Di | Yi,Wi, Ai) = Pr(Di | Yi,Wi). 
S1.2 Proof of Theorem 2
We need the following lemma.
Lemma S1 Suppose Assumption 2 holds. Then, for any covariates Vi, we have
Pr(Di = 1 | R = (0, 0),Vi, Ai) = 1− Pr(Di = 0, Yi = 0 | Vi, Ai)
Pr(Ri = (0, 0) | Vi, Ai) ,
Pr(Di = 1 | R = (0, 1),Vi, Ai) = Pr(Yi = 0 | Vi, Ai)− Pr(Ri = (0, 0) | Vi, Ai)
Pr(Ri = (0, 1) | Vi, Ai) ,
Pr(Di = 1 | R = (1, 1),Vi, Ai) = Pr(Di = 1, Yi = 1 | Vi, Ai)
Pr(Ri = (1, 1) | Vi, Ai) .
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Proof of Lemma S1. Under Assumption 2, we can write
Pr(Ri = (0, 0) | Vi, Ai) = Pr(Yi(0) = 0 | Vi, Ai), (S4)
Pr(Ri = (0, 1) | Vi, Ai) = Pr(Yi(0) = 1 | Vi, Ai)− Pr(Yi(1) = 1 | Vi, Ai),
Pr(Ri = (1, 1) | Vi, Ai) = Pr(Yi(1) = 1 | Vi, Ai).
Therefore, we obtain
Pr(Di = 1 | Ri = (0, 0),Vi, Ai) = 1− Pr(Di = 0, Ri = (0, 0) | Vi, Ai)
Pr(Ri = (0, 0) | Vi, Ai) = 1−
Pr(Di = 0, Yi = 0 | Vi, Ai)
Pr(Ri = (0, 0) | Vi, Ai) ,
Pr(Di = 1 | Ri = (1, 1),Vi, Ai) = Pr(Di = 1, Ri = (1, 1) | Vi, Ai)
Pr(Ri = (1, 1) | Vi, Ai) =
Pr(Di = 1, Yi = 1 | Vi, Ai)
Pr(Ri = (1, 1) | Vi, Ai) ,
and
Pr(Di = 1 | Ri = (0, 1),Vi, Ai)
=
Pr(Di = 1, Ri = (0, 1) | Vi, Ai)
Pr(Ri = (0, 1) | Vi, Ai)
=
Pr(Di = 1 | Vi, Ai)− Pr(Di = 1, Ri = (1, 1) | Vi, Ai)
Pr(Ri = (0, 1) | Vi, Ai) −
Pr(Di = 1, Ri = (0, 0) | Vi, Ai)
Pr(Ri = (0, 1) | Vi, Ai)
=
Pr(Di = 1 | Vi, Ai)− Pr(Di = 1, Yi = 1 | Vi, Ai)
Pr(Ri = (0, 1) | Vi, Ai)
−Pr(Ri = (0, 0) | Vi, Ai)− Pr(Di = 0, Ri = (0, 0) | Vi, Ai)
Pr(Ri = (0, 1) | Vi, Ai)
=
Pr(Di = 1, Yi = 0 | Vi, Ai)
Pr(Ri = (0, 1) | Vi, Ai) −
Pr(Ri = (0, 0) | Vi, Ai)− Pr(Di = 0, Yi = 0 | Vi, Ai)
Pr(Ri = (0, 1) | Vi, Ai)
=
Pr(Yi = 0 | Vi, Ai)− Pr(Ri = (0, 0) | Vi, Ai)
Pr(Ri = 1 | Vi, Ai) .

We now prove Theorem 2. From Theorem 1, it suffices to show that the three statistical fairness
criteria imply principal fairness. From the three statistical fairness criteria, we have
Pr(Di, Yi |Wi, Ai) = Pr(Di, Yi |Wi). (S5)
Applying Lemma S1 with Vi = Wi, we have
Pr(Di = 1 | R = (0, 0),Wi, Ai) = 1− Pr(Di = 0, Yi = 0 |Wi, Ai)
Pr(Ri = (0, 0) |Wi, Ai) , (S6)
Pr(Di = 1 | R = (0, 1),Wi, Ai) = Pr(Yi = 0 |Wi, Ai)− Pr(Ri = (0, 0) |Wi, Ai)
Pr(Ri = (0, 1) |Wi, Ai) , (S7)
Pr(Di = 1 | R = (1, 1),Wi, Ai) = Pr(Di = 1, Yi = 1 |Wi, Ai)
Pr(Ri = (1, 1) |Wi, Ai) . (S8)
From Assumption 1 and (S5), all terms on the right-hand sides of (S6), (S7), (S8) do not depend on
Ai. As a result, we have Pr(Di | Ri,Wi, Ai) = Pr(Di | Ri,Wi). 
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S1.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Applying Lemma S1 with Vi = ∅, we have
Pr(Di = 1 | R = (0, 0), Ai) = 1− Pr(Di = 0, Yi = 0 | Ai)
Pr(Ri = (0, 0) | Ai) , (S9)
Pr(Di = 1 | R = (0, 1), Ai) = Pr(Yi = 0 | Ai)− Pr(Ri = (0, 0) | Ai)
Pr(Ri = (0, 1) | Ai) , (S10)
Pr(Di = 1 | R = (1, 1), Ai) = Pr(Di = 1, Yi = 1 | Ai)
Pr(Ri = (1, 1) | Ai) . (S11)
From (S4), we have
Pr(Ri = (0, 0) | Ai) = Pr(Yi(0) = 0 | Ai)
= E{Pr(Yi(0) = 0 | Xi) | Ai}
= E{Pr(Yi = 0 | Di = 0,Xi) | Ai},
where the second equality follows from the law of total probability and the third equality follows
from Assumption 3. Similarly, we can obtain
Pr(Ri = (0, 1) | Ai) = E{Pr(Yi = 1 | Di = 0,Xi) | Ai} − E{Pr(Yi = 1 | Di = 1,Xi) | Ai},
and
Pr(Ri = (1, 1) | Ai) = E{Pr(Yi = 1 | Di = 1,Xi) | Ai}.
Plugging the expressions for Pr(Ri | Ai) into (S9) to (S11) yields the formulas in Theorem 3. 
We generalize Theorem 3 to the identification of Pr(Di | R,Wi, Ai). Applying Lemma S1 with
Vi = Wi, we have
Pr(Di = 1 | R = (0, 0),Wi, Ai) = 1− Pr(Di = 0, Yi = 0 |Wi, Ai)
Pr(Ri = (0, 0) |Wi, Ai) , (S12)
Pr(Di = 1 | R = (0, 1),Wi, Ai) = Pr(Yi = 0 | Ai)− Pr(Ri = (0, 0) |Wi, Ai)
Pr(Ri = (0, 1) |Wi, Ai) , (S13)
Pr(Di = 1 | R = (1, 1),Wi, Ai) = Pr(Di = 1, Yi = 1 |Wi, Ai)
Pr(Ri = (1, 1) |Wi, Ai) . (S14)
Similarly, under Assumption 3, we have
Pr(Ri = (0, 0) |Wi, Ai) = E{Pr(Yi = 0 | Di = 0,Xi) |Wi, Ai},
Pr(Ri = (0, 1) |Wi, Ai) = E{Pr(Yi = 1 | Di = 0,Xi) |Wi, Ai} − E{Pr(Yi = 1 | Di = 1,Xi) |Wi, Ai},
Pr(Ri = (1, 1) |Wi, Ai) = E{Pr(Yi = 1 | Di = 1,Xi) |Wi, Ai},
where we assume Xi contains (Wi, Ai). Plugging these into (S12) to (S14) yields
Pr(Di = 1 | Ri = (0, 0),Wi, Ai) = 1− Pr(Di = 0, Yi = 0 |Wi, Ai)E{Pr(Yi = 0 | Di = 0,Xi) |Wi, Ai} ,
Pr(Di = 1 | Ri = (0, 1),Wi, Ai) = E{Pr(Yi = 1 | Di = 0,Xi) |Wi, Ai} − Pr(Yi = 1 |Wi, Ai)E{Pr(Yi = 1 | Di = 0,Xi) | Ai} − E{Pr(Yi = 1 | Di = 1,Xi) |Wi, Ai} ,
Pr(Di = 1 | Ri = (1, 1),Wi, Ai) = Pr(Di = 1, Yi = 1 |Wi, Ai)E{Pr(Yi = 1 | Di = 1,Xi) |Wi, Ai} .

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